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REMUNERATION REPORT FOR YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE 2015 i STI achieved The following table outlines the percentage of target STI achieved and forfeited in relation to financial and non-financial KPIs and the total STI awarded for each Executive KMP for 2015. Financial Non-financial Total STI On Target Opportunity Weighting Achieved Forfeited Weighting Achieved Forfeited STI awarded Rhys Holleran 400000 80 0 100 20 88 12 70000 Nick McKechnie 125000 80 0 100 20 70 30 17500 Guy Dobson 100000 80 0 100 20 70 30 14000 Rick Lenarcic 100000 80 60 40 20 100 0 68003 Andrea Ingham 100000 80 0 100 20 50 50 10000 j Retention bonus The Board determined that Nick McKechnie and Guy Dobson would be provided with a retention bonus opportunity upon the transition of the former CEO Rhys Holleran. The purpose of the retention bonus is to incentivise the selected KMP to remain with the Group during the transition period of leadership by the Executive Chairman and following the appointment of a new CEO. The retention bonus for Nick McKechnie is 120000 subject to continuing employment to 30 June 2016 and Guy Dobson is 100000 subject to continuing employment and certain other performance targets. Instead of a retention bonus Rick Lenarcic was given a 100000 salary increase for 2016. As this retention bonus is in addition to the usual STI scheme it is proposed that it be issued at the end of the period in equity. Levels of equity holding by management are limited given the low vesting levels of historic LTI schemes and the turnover of KMP and this will add to a process of increasing the level of equity holding by management and provide greater alignment with shareholders. For 2016 the Committee will review whether a NED and KMP shareholding policy is appropriate. k Long-term incentives What is the LTI The Group operates an executive LTI plan which provides Executive KMP with grants of performance rights over ordinary shares for nil consideration. A new plan was introduced during the year that issued performance rights to KMP that are exercisable subject to a three-year performance period and the satisfaction of set performance criteria during the period that includes both EPS targets 50 weighting and TSR targets 50 weighting. The residual plan that included both Executive KMP and other senior executives has a number of performance rights that will reach their vesting dates over the next 3 years as these plans were for either 3 or 4 years. These performance rights vest based on satisfaction of TSR performance criteria only. What is the performance and vesting period During the financial year the Group introduced a revised LTI plan commencing on 1 July 2014 applying to Executive KMP only. This plan has a three-year performance period with a single-point vesting schedule i.e. 100 of performance rights vest at the end of the performance period subject to performance criteria being met. 30 SOUTHERN CROSS AUSTEREO ANNUAL REPORT 2015